State v. Bowman Appellant\u27s Brief 1 Dckt. 41813 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
11-7-2014
State v. Bowman Appellant's Brief 1 Dckt. 41813
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Bowman Appellant's Brief 1 Dckt. 41813" (2014). Not Reported. 1816.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1816
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
STEVEN KENNETH BOWMAN, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________ ) 
NO. 41813 
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2013-4994 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE MELISSA MOODY 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #8701 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720a0010 
(208) 334-4534 
... g, f'..,:r"\. 
HI 1-1: .. I f11,1:,ti_..._, 
----7 
NOV - 7 201it 1 
___ .. ___ ............. -.. ., ... J 
Supreme co~rL-:~co_1i,t ot Appeals._._, 
~mered on Af ., bi-.:=:== •• --• 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
OF AUTHORITI ........................................................................................ iii 
ENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................ 1 
Nature of the Case........... .. . . .. ................... ............................... ...... . .. 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................................................................................. 7 
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................... 8 
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Bowman's Motion To 
ppress The Evidence Found In The Car ............................................................... 8 
Introduction ........................................................................................................ 8 
8. Standard Of Review ............................................................................................. 9 
C. The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Bowman's Motion To Suppress 
The Evidence In the Car, Since The Officers Unlawfully Prolonged The 
Detention Of Mr. Bowman To Allow A Drug Dog To Sniff His Car ........................ 9 
1. The District Court's Factual Findings Regarding The Prolonging 
Of The Stop Were Clearly Erroneous ............................................................ 11 
2. The District Court's Legal Conclusions Regarding Whether The 
Officers Unlawfully Prolonged The Detention Of Mr. Bowman 
Were Contradictory To Precedent ................................................................. 14 
3. The Purpose Of The Stop Did Not Legitimately Evolve Beyond 
The Domestic Violence Investigation ............................................................. 15 
D. The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Bowman's Motion To Suppress, 
Since The Evidence Found In Mr. Bowman's Car Was Fruit Of Officer 
O'Gorman's Unlawful Search Of Mr. Bowman's Pocket.. .................................... 17 
1. The Minimal Temporal Separation Between The Unlawful Search 
And The Evidence Found In The Car Indicates That The Taint 
Affects The Evidence Found In The Car ........................................................ 19 
2. There Were No Intervening Circumstances Sufficient To Separate 
The Evidence Found In The Car From The Taint Of The Unlawful 
Search ........................................................................................................... 19 
a. The Independent Source Doctrine Is Inapplicable In This Case ............... 19 
b. The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Is Inapplicable In This Case ............... 20 
c. The Attenuation Basis Exception Is Not Applicable In This Case ............. 21 
3. The Flagrancy Of The Officer's Misconduct And Lack Of Reasonable 
Purpose For The Unlawful Search Demonstrates That The Taint 
From The Unlawful Search Extends To The Evidence Found In 
The Car. ......................................................................................................... 22 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 25 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .......................................................................................... 26 
ii 
Cases 
v. Illinois, U. 590 (1975) ......................................................... 18 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) ........................................................... 13 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) ............................................................. 9, 10 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) ............................................................. 17 
Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322 (2003) ........................................................... 9 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961 ) ....................................................................... 8 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) .......................................................... 8, 24 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U . 436 (1966) ............................................................ 3 
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) ... ................... ...... .................... 1 
State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560 (Ct. App. 2005) ............................................. 9, 17 
State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245 (1990) .......................................................... 17 
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804 (2009) .......................................................... 22, 24 
State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1 (Ct. App. 2009) ............................................ 10, 16 
State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405 (2012) .......................................................... 9, 10 
State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469 (2001) ................................................................. 8 
State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728 (Ct. App. 2005) ..................................................... 22 
State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647 (Ct. App. 2002) .............................................. 10 
State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655 (2006) .................................................... 9, 22, 24 
State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501 (1999) ............................................................ 8, 24 
State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516 (1986) ............................................................... 8 
State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511 (2012) .................................................................. 25 
iii 
State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 436,442 n.2 (Ct. App. 2001) ................................. 14 
State v. t\4yers, 118 Idaho 608 (Ct. App. 1990) ................................................... 14 
State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841 (2004) .......................................................... passim 
State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187 (2000) .............................................................. 18 
State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886 (Ct. App. 2008) ............................................... 15 
State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260 (Ct. App. 2001 ) ................................................... 13 
State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180 (Ct. App. 2005) ............................................. 17 
State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 532 (Ct. App. 2000) .................................................. 14 
Stuartv. State, 136 ldaho490 (2001) ........................................................... 19, 21 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ........................................................................... 9 
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) ................................................. 21 
United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 1997) ................................... 18, 19 
United States v. Ramos, No.1 :11-cr-111, 2012 WL 2370204, *1 (D. Vermont 
June 22, 2012) ................................................................................................. 14 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ............................. 10, 16, 17, 18 
Woodward v. State, 142 Idaho 98 (Ct. App. 2005) .............................................. 14 
Constitutional Provisions 
IDAHO CONST. Art. I,§ 17 ....................................................................................... 8 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV .......................................................................................... 8 
iv 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Steven Bowman appeals, contending that the district court erred when it denied 
his motion to suppress in regard to the evidence found in his car. He asserts that the 
district court's decision was wrong for two reasons. First, the officers unlawfully 
prolonged his detention in order to allow a drug dog to sniff the car, which they only 
searched after the dog alerted. Second, as the district court properly found that the 
officers unlawfully searched Mr. Bowman's pocket, and so, suppressed the evidence 
found therein, the evidence subsequently found in the car should have been 
as fruit of that poisonous tree. either reason, this Court should reverse 
the district court's order denying Mr. Bowman's motion to suppress the evidence found 
in his car and remand this case for further proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
At approximately 5:00 p.m. on April 13, 2013, police dispatch received a call 
from Brant Casey, who reported witnessing a domestic battery between the two people 
in the car in front of him. (Tr., Vol.1, p.10, L.2 - p.12, L.10; Tr., Vol.1, p.15, Ls.16-18.)1 
Specifically, Mr. Casey reported that the female passenger in the car had hit the male 
driver in the head. (Tr., Vol.1, p.10, Ls.5-6.) The driver responded defensively by 
pushing the passenger away from himself with his hand on her neck. (Tr., Vol.1, p.17, 
Ls.4-14.) The passenger continued to sporadically hit the driver, and he tried to defend 
1 The transcripts in this case are contained in two independently bound and paginated 
volumes. To avoid confusion, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume containing the transcript 
from the hearing on Mr. Bowman's motion to suppress, held on September 18, 2013. 
"Vol.2" will refer to the volume containing the transcripts of the change of plea hearing 
held on November 22, 2013, and the sentencing hearing held on January 3, 2014. 
1 
himself, but, with his attention thus divided, the car swerved into other lanes of traffic, 
including a bicycle lane. (Tr., Vol.1, p.11, L.7 - p.12, L.7.) Mr. Casey continued to 
follow the car, relaying his observations to dispatch. (Tr., Vol.1, p.12, Ls.14-16.) 
Mr. Casey did not report seeing any weapons, and had he seen such items, he would 
have informed dispatch. (Tr., Vol.1, p.16, Ls.5-19.) 
Three Garden City police officers, Tyler Domeny, James O'Gorman, and 
Sergeant Jerry Walbey, responded to Mr. Casey's call. (Tr., Vol.1, p.20, Ls.15-20.) 
Dispatch informed the officers that Mr. Bowman was the registered owner of the 
suspect vehicle. (Tr., Vol.1, p.42, Ls.10-11; Exhibit 1, Video 1, approximately 0:11.)2 
The suspect vehicle yielded when the officers arrived. (Tr., Vol.1, p.42, Ls.1-7.) 
Mr. Casey also pulled over, and Sergeant Walbey met with him. (Tr., Vol.1, p.80, 
Ls.4-8.) Meanwhile, Officer Domeny approached the driver, who turned out to be 
Mr. Bowman, and ordered him out of the car. (Tr., Vol.1, p.21, Ls.12-15.) Officer 
Domeny looked for, but did not see, any indications of weapons during this initial 
encounter. (Tr., Vol.1, p.44, Ls.1-6.) Mr. Bowman got out of the car, and Officer 
Domeny immediately placed Mr. Bowman in handcuffs, telling Mr. Bowman that he was 
being detained, but not arrested. (Tr., Vol.1, p.21, Ls.12-15.) 
After securing Mr. Bowman, Officer Domeny asked if he had any weapons on 
him, and Mr. Bowman responded that he did not. (Tr., Vol.1, p.23, L.23 - p.24, L.2.) 
Officer Domeny asked if Mr. Bowman "Mind if I check?" (Exhibit 1, Video 1, 
2 Exhibit 1 was introduced during the hearing on Mr. Bowman's motion to suppress. 
It consists of two video clips recorded from Officer Domeny's dashboard camera. The 
first video shows the traffic stop and initial encounter with Mr. Bowman. The second 
video shows part of Officer O'Gorman's search of Mr. Bowman's pocket. As such, 
references to that exhibit will identify the relevant video clip, and, if possible, will identify 
the relevant period of the recording. 
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approximately 2:29; see Tr., Vol.1, p.24, L.4 (Officer Domeny testifying he asked 
permission to check for weapons.) Mr. Bowman responded "Yeah." (Exhibit 1, Video 1, 
approximately 2:29; but see Tr., Vol.1, p.48, L.8 (Officer Domeny testifying that 
Mr. Bowman told him, "Go ahead").) At about the same time Mr. Bowman answered, 
Officer Domeny began to pat down Mr. Bowman. (Tr., VoU, p.47, L.22 - p.48, L.8; 
Exhibit 1, Video 1, approximately 2:29.) Officer Domeny did not find any weapons 
during that search. (Tr., Vol.1, p.59, Ls.10-11.) However, he did not remove the 
handcuffs from Mr. Bowman. (See generally Exhibit 1, Video 1.) Instead, Officer 
Domeny read Mr. Bowman his rights pursuant to Miranda, 3 and asked him about the 
reported domestic battery. (Tr., Vol.1, p.23, Ls.15-18.) 
After that discussion with Mr. Bowman, Officer Domeny returned to his car to run 
Mr. Bowman's information for potential warrants. (Tr., Vol.1, p24, Ls.6-18.) As he was 
doing that, Officer O'Gorman came to the window to talk with him.4 (Tr., Vol.1, p.24, 
Ls.24-25.) At that time, Officer Domeny turned off his dashboard camera. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.24, L.23 - p.25, L.1.) While the camera was off, both officers testified that they saw 
Mr. Bowman attempting to get his hands into his right pants pocket. (Tr., Vol.1, p.25, 
Ls.8-13; Tr., p.68, Ls.18-25.) Officer O'Gorman went over and asked what he was 
trying to reach, and Mr. Bowman responded that he was trying to get a cigarette. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.69, Ls.5-7.) Officer O'Gorman proceeded to pat the pocket and felt an 
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
4 Officer O'Gorman had initially engaged the passenger, Angela Phillips (also referred to 
as "Angela Turner'' in some portions of the record). Officer O'Gorman had her get out of 
the car, placed her in handcuffs, and subjected her to a partial pat down search. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.64, Ls.3-13; Tr., Vol.1, p.75, Ls.9-13 (explaining that he only patted down 
the pockets at Ms. Phillips' waist, but not her torso).) After completing that pat down 
search, he placed Ms. Phillips, still in handcuffs, in the back of his police vehicle. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.64, Ls.11-13.) Later, he went back and discussed the reported domestic 
battery and got her side of the story. (Tr., Vol.1, p.66, Ls.1-3.) 
3 
item consistent with a pack of cigarettes and did not feel anything indicative of a 
weapon. (Tr., Vol.1, p. 75, L.17 - p.76, L.5.) Nevertheless, Officer O'Gorman reached 
into Mr. Bowman's pocket. (Tr., Vol.1, p.69, L.20.) He pulled out a pack of cigarettes 
and a baggie with a crystalline substance, which was subsequently field tested and 
identified as presumptively positive for methamphetamine.5 (Tr., Vol.1, p.69, Ls.20-24; 
Tr., Vol.1, p.26, Ls.19-24.) Upon finding the baggie, Officer O'Gorman placed 
Mr. Bowman under arrest for possession of a controlled substance and put him in the 
back of Officer Domeny's vehicle. (Tr., Vol.1, p.27, Ls.1-3.) At that point, Mr. Bowman 
invoked his right to an attorney. (Tr., Vol.1, p.54, Ls.10-17.) As such, no further 
questions were asked of him. (Tr. Vol.1, p.54, Ls.16-25.) 
Around that same time, Sergeant Walbey finished his conversation with 
Mr. Casey (the reporting witness) and joined the other officers. (Tr., Vol.1, p.27, 
Ls.5-9.) They discussed what they had each learned in their interviews of the three 
people involved and decided what course of action they were going to take in regard to 
the domestic violence investigation. (Tr., Vol.1, p.55, Ls.18-21.) Specifically, they 
decided to arrest Ms. Phillips for misdemeanor domestic battery, which they did. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.66, Ls.15-24.) Officer Domeny testified that, after they made that decision, 
he considered the investigation of the domestic violence report complete. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.55, Ls.16-21.) 
Officers Domeny and O'Gorman also informed Sergeant Walbey that they had 
found methamphetamine in Mr. Bowman's pocket, and so, asked him to have his drug 
dog, Bullet, sniff Mr. Bowman's car. (Tr., Vol.1, p.27, Ls.5-9.) Sergeant Walbey did so, 
5 Part of the way through Officer O'Gorman's search of Mr. Bowman's pocket, Officer 
Domeny reactivated his dashboard camera. (See Exhibit 1, Video 2.) 
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and Bullet alerted on the car. (Tr., Vol.1, p.84, L.22 - p.85, L.18.) Officer Domeny 
proceeded to search the car. (Tr., Vol.1, p.28, L 14.) During that search, he found a 
locked safe, which he pried open. (Tr., VoL1, p.28, L.20 - p.29, L.13.) Inside, he found 
several baggies (two purportedly containing methamphetamine ), a digital scale with 
some residue on it, and several hundred dollars in cash. (Tr., Vol.1, p.29, L.22 - p.30, 
L.6.) 
The State ultimately charged Mr. Bowman with possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to deliver, misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, and a 
persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.63-64, 110-12.) It consolidated Mr. Bowman's 
case with the case against Ms. Phillips.6 (See R., pp.12, 124.) Mr. Bowman filed a 
motion to suppress all the evidence in this case. (R., p.92.) Ms. Phillips joined in that 
motion. (See R., p.124.) 
The district court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part. 
Specifically, it found that the State had failed to prove that Officer O'Gorman's search of 
Mr. Bowman's pocket fell within any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and 
so, it suppressed the baggie found in Mr. Bowman's pocket. (R., pp.129-31.) However, 
it concluded that the taint of Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search of Mr. Bowman did not 
require the suppression of the evidence found in the car. (R., p.132.) Rather, it 
concluded that the sniff was sufficiently independent from Officer O'Gorman's search of 
Mr. Bowman's pocket. (R., p.132.) The district court also found that the detention of 
Mr. Bowman was not unlawfully prolonged based on its determination that, while Bullet 
sniffed the car, Officer O'Gorman went back to ask Mr. Bowman some more questions 
6 Officer Domeny had also found a backpack in the car, which had some used 
hypodermic needles and Ms. Phillips' identification in it. (Tr., Vol.1, p.30, Ls.14-20.) 
5 
and that purported conversation was relevant to the domestic violence investigation. 
(R.,p.133.) 
Mr. Bowman ultimately entered a conditional guilty plea, pursuant to a plea 
agreement. He agreed to plead guilty to possession with intent to deliver, and reserved 
his right to challenge the order denying the motion to suppress. (Tr., Vol.2, p.12, 
Ls.15.17.) In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the paraphernalia charge and the 
persistent violator enhancement, and to make certain sentencing recommendations. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.12, Ls.6-15.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, 
with two and one-half years fixed, concurrent to another sentence Mr. Bowman had 
been ordered to serve. (Tr., Vol.2, p.50, Ls.16-25; R., pp.148-50.) Mr. Bowman filed a 
timely notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.153-55.) 
6 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Bowman's motion to suppress the 
evidence found in the car. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Bowman's Motion To Suppress The Evidence 
Found In The Car 
A. Introduction 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend. 
IV. The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961 ); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 
516, (1986). The Idaho Constitution provides its own, similar protections against 
un searches and seizures. IDAHO CONST. Art. I,§ 17; v. Donato, 135 
Idaho 469, 471 (2001 ). 
A unanimous United States Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches 
are per se unreasonable. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Therefore, a 
warrantless search is presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment, unless the State 
demonstrates that one of the exceptional, well-established, and well-delineated 
exceptions to the warrant requirement is applicable. Id. at 390-91; see also State v. 
Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503-04 (1999) (holding the same standard applies to Art. I,§ 17 
of the Idaho Constitution). 
There are several reasons why the evidence found in Mr. Bowman's car should 
have been suppressed in this case. First, the officers unlawfully prolonged their 
detention of Mr. Bowman to allow the dog sniff of the car, and that sniff led to the 
discovery of the evidence in the car. As the prolonged detention was unlawful, any 
evidence found as a result of that prolonged detention should have been suppressed. 
Second, since Sergeant Walbey had Bullet sniff Mr. Bowman's car because Officer 
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O'Gorman had found methamphetamine during an unlawful search of Mr. Bowman's 
pocket, the canine sniff is not sufficiently attenuated as to constitute an independent 
investigation. Therefore, the evidence in the car should have been suppressed as fruit 
of the poisonous tree. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact 
that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843 
(2004 ). However, where the district court's factual findings are not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence, this Court should set those factual findings aside 
as clearly erroneous. Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 325 (2003) 
C. The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Bowman's Motion To Suppress The 
Evidence In the Car, Since The Officers Unlawfully Prolonged The Detention Of 
Mr. Bowman To Allow A Drug Dog To Sniff His Car 
Traffic stops are limited in scope, and in that regard, are analogous to 
investigative detentions. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 409 (2012). As such, they 
are limited by the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Danney, 153 
Idaho at 409. Therefore, such detentions "'must be temporary and last no longer than 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."' Id. (quoting State v. Henage, 143 
Idaho 655, 658 (2007) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983))). Of course, 
the purpose of the stop can evolve if officers legitimately become aware of facts or 
circumstances that create a reasonable suspicion which justifies pursuing some other 
line of inquiry. See, e.g., State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App. 2005). 
9 
However, where officers do not legitimately become aware of such facts or 
circumstances, any prolonged detention, even a momentary one, is unreasonable and 
infringes on the seized person's constitutional rights. Royer, 460 U.S. at 498; 
State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 652 (Ct. App. 2002). It is the State's burden to 
demonstrate that the seizure was sufficiently limited in scope and duration. 
State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 6 (Ct. App. 2009). Furthermore, if the officers seize 
evidence pursuant to an unreasonable detention, that evidence is considered to be fruit 
of the poisonous tree, and therefore, is not admissible. Id. at 8 (citing Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,487 (1963)). 
The violation of Mr. Bowman's rights in this regard is clear. Officers pulled over 
Mr. Bowman's car to investigate a report of domestic battery. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, 
p.19, Ls.16-22.) Therefore, absent legitimately-discovered facts justifying an evolution 
of the purpose of the stop, the detention of Mr. Bowman could only last as long as it was 
necessary for officers to investigate and resolve the report of a domestic battery. 
See Royer, 460 U.S. at 500; Danney, 153 Idaho at 409. 
The officers' investigation into the reported domestic battery was completed 
when the officers decided to place Ms. Phillips under arrest for misdemeanor domestic 
battery. As the dog sniff did not begin until after Ms. Phillips was placed under arrest, 
absent legitimately-discovered facts justifying the continued detention of Mr. Bowman at 
that point, the dog sniff unlawfully prolonged his detention. The only evidence that 
might have justified prolonging the detention was the baggie found in Mr. Bowman's 
pocket. However, as that evidence was found during an unlawful search, it cannot be 
the justification for prolonging the detention. As such, there were no legitimately-
discovered facts to justify continuing to detain Mr. Bowman after Ms. Phillips was 
10 
arrested. Since the dog sniff occurred after Ms. Phillips was arrested, the dog sniff 
unlawfully prolonged Mr. Bowman's detention. 
However, the district cowi determined that the stop was not unlawfully prolonged 
based on its findings that Officer O'Gorman went back to talk with Mr. Bowman while 
Sergeant Walbey deployed the drug dog, and that the purported conversation between 
Officer O'Gorman and Mr. Bowman was necessary to complete the investigation of the 
reported domestic battery. (R., p.133.) As a result, it concluded that the investigation 
was still properly on-going while Bullet sniffed the car, and thus, the dog sniff did not 
unlawfully prolong the detention. (R., p.133.) 
The district court's conclusion is wrong on several levels. It includes two clearly 
erroneous findings of fact and it also misapplies the relevant law. As such, the district 
court's determination that the officers did not unlawfully extend Mr. Bowman's detention 
to allow for the drug dog to sniff his car should be reversed. 
1. The District Court's Factual Findings Regarding The Prolonging Of The 
Stop Were Clearly Erroneous 
The district court's factual finding that Officer O'Gorman was continuing to 
investigate the domestic battery while Bullet sniffed Mr. Bowman's car is clearly 
erroneous. The officers' testimony reveals that the domestic violence investigation was 
completed before the dog snitf began: 
Q. [by defense counsel for Mr. Bowman]. When did you [Officer Domeny] 
deem the investigation complete, exactly? 
A. After I met with the other officers and got all sides of the story, we 
talked to each other and decided what course of action to take. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.55, Ls.16-21.) Therefore, the investigation consisted of Officer Domeny 
getting Mr. Bowman's account of the events, Officer O'Gorman getting Ms. Phillips' side 
11 
of the story, and Sergeant Walbey getting the reporting witness's statement. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.49, Ls.1-7; Tr., Vol.1, p.66, Ls.7-9; Tr., Vol.1, p.80, Ls.6-14.) Once they all finished 
getting the various accounts, they gathered together to decide what course of action 
they were going to take to resolve the investigation of the reported domestic battery. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.55, Ls.18-21.) That decision was to arrest Ms. Phillips for misdemeanor 
domestic battery. (Tr., Vol.1, p.66, Ls.15-24.) At that point, Ms. Phillips was placed 
under "formal arrest."7 (Tr., Vol.1, p.66, Ls. 22-24.) Therefore, the investigation was 
complete upon the arrest of Ms. Phillips. (Tr., Vol.1, p.55, Ls.16-21.) Since the dog 
sniff did not begin until after they made the decision to arrest Ms. Phillips (see, e.g., 
Tr., Vol.1, p.81, Ls.16-23), the district court's conclusion that the investigation continued 
while Sergeant Walbey deployed the drug dog was clearly erroneous and should be set 
aside by this Court. 
Similarly, the district court's finding that Officer Gorman went back to ask 
Mr. Bowman questions while Bullet sniffed the car is clearly erroneous. That 
determination was based solely on Sergeant Walbey's statement that, at the time the 
dog sniff was occurring, "I think Officer O'Gorman was back talking with Mr. Bowman at 
that time." (Tr., Vol.1, p.87, Ls.12-14.) However, that is not substantial or competent 
evidence. The fact that Sergeant Walbey testified "/ think Officer O'Gorman was back 
talking ... " demonstrates that he was not certain what Officer O'Gorman was doing. 
This is particularly obvious in light of Officer Domeny's affirmative assertions to the 
contrary. Officer Domeny was certain that the officers did not talk to Mr. Bowman while 
7 That was actually easily accomplished, as Ms. Phillips was already in handcuffs in the 
back of a patrol car at that point in time. ( See Tr., Vol.1, p.64, Ls.11-13.) 
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the dog sniff was occurring for one simple reason: "[Mr. Bowman] said he wanted to 
speak with a lawyer." (Tr., Vol.1, p.54, Ls.10-25.) 
Officer Domeny testified that Mr. Bowman invoked his right to counsel when he 
was placed under arrest for possession of methamphetamine following Officer 
O'Gorman's search of his pocket At that point, "We were done talking with him .... No 
other questions were asked of him." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.54, Ls.20, 25 (emphasis added).) 
As Mr. Bowman was placed under arrest before the dog sniff began (see, e.g., 
Tr., Vol.1, p.27, Ls.1-9), there was not substantial and competent evidence to support 
the district court's finding that Officer O'Gorman was, in fact, talking with Mr. Bowman 
during the dog sniff. As such, that finding should be rejected as clearly erroneous. 
And even if Officer O'Gorman was talking with Mr. Bowman, there is absolutely 
no evidence that the purported conversation was relevant to the investigation of the 
reported domestic battery. (See generally Tr., Vol.1, p.87, Ls.12-14 (only indicating that 
a conversation occurred, not what the conversation was about).)8 Therefore, even if 
Officer Gorman was talking to Mr. Bowman, there is no evidence to support the district 
court's conclusion that the investigation into the domestic battery was continuing while 
the dog sniff was proceeding.9 Because its conclusion that the officers did not 
8 As no other evidence mentions this conversation at all (see, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.662, 
L.8 - p. 78, L.4 (Officer O'Gorman's testimony); Exhibit 1 ), there is no evidence in the 
record to indicate what that purported conversation was about. 
9 If the district court's findings that Officer O'Gorman asked Mr. Bowman questions 
relevant to the investigation of the domestic battery during the dog sniff are appropriate, 
then those factual findings demonstrate that Officer O'Gorman violated Mr. Bowman's 
Fifth and/or Sixth Amendment right to counsel by continuing to interrogate him after an 
unequivocal and unwaived invocation of his right to counsel. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 
U.S. 477,485 (1981); State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260,267 (Ct. App. 2001). In that case, 
the district court still could not find that Officer O'Gorman's actions justified prolonging 
the stop. As the federal district court of Vermont determined in a similar case, "law 
enforcement cannot prolong a roadside detention in order to conduct an interrogation in 
violation of Miranda, and then use the evidence gleaned from the Miranda violation to 
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unlawfully prolong the stop to allow for the dog sniff was based on clearly erroneous 
findings of fact, it shou!d be reversed. 
2. The District Court's Legal Conclusions Regarding Whether The Officers 
Unlawfully Prolonged The Detention Of Mr. Bowman Were Contradictory 
To Precedent 
The district court's conclusion that Officer O'Gorman could, after the officers had 
gathered a!I the information necessary to conclude their investigation, reasonably delay 
releasing Mr. Bowman by asking him additional, unnecessary questions, such that the 
drug dog sniff of the car did not delay the detention, is an inappropriate legal conclusion. 
The law in this regard is clear: it is unreasonable for officers to stall or draw out their 
investigative efforts in order to allow a drug dog to arrive and sniff the vehicle. For 
example: 
In [State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 532 (Ct. App. 2000)], the police officer 
purposefully detained the defendant for an unreasonable period to allow 
time for a drug canine unit to arrive. In the present case, [the defendant] 
was not detained except for six minutes during which the officer obtained 
and held his vehicle registration for a routine records check, and the thirty-
minute delay between the time of first contact with [the defendant] to the 
time the officers walked [the dog] around the car was not a stalling tactic 
to allow time for the dog to arrive. 
State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 436, 442 n.2 (Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis added). The Court 
of Appeals has also found that, where the evidence does not indicate that the officer is 
justify the prolonged detention .... the [subsequent] canine sniff was the product of an 
unlawful detention under the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Ramos, No.1 :11-cr-
111, 2012 WL 2370204, *1 (D. Vermont June 22, 2012). In similar decisions, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals has indicated, a Miranda violation is a factor which indicates that the 
police action is not reasonable in the totality of the circumstances, and so, indicates that 
the police action violates the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Woodward v. State, 142 
Idaho 98, 107 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 612 (Ct. App. 1990). In 
this case, that means Officer O'Gorman's violation of Mr. Bowman's Miranda rights 
would make the prolonged detention to interrogate Mr. Bowman unreasonable. As a 
result, it would not justify the prolonged detention, and therefore, the dog sniff occurred 
during an unlawfully prolonged stop. 
14 
purposefully delaying resolving the investigation to facilitate a dog sniff, the time it 
reasonably takes the officer to resolve the investigation does not violate the defendant's 
rights. State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 890 (Ct. App. 2008). 
Contrarily, the district court's decision in this case would allow an officer to delay 
resolving the investigation, despite having all the information necessary to do so, by 
asking nonessential, even unrelated, additional questions of the defendant in an effort to 
buy time for a dog sniff to occur. (See R., p.133.) Therefore, besides being factually 
erroneous, the district court's determination that the detention of Mr. Bowman was 
lawfully prolonged is legally erroneous and should be rejected by this Court. The 
officers had all the information they needed to resolve the investigation of the reported 
domestic battery. Therefore, any stalling or purposeful delaying by Officer O'Gorman 
after that point was unreasonable and violated Mr. Bowman's rights. 
Since the purpose of the stop was complete at the point the officers decided to 
arrest Ms. Phillips for domestic battery, unless there was some other legitimate 
justification for the continuing detention of Mr. Bowman, the officers unlawfully 
prolonged that detention after the domestic violence investigation was complete to allow 
Bullet to sniff the car. 
3. The Purpose Of The Stop Did Not Legitimately Evolve Beyond The 
Domestic Violence Investigation 
The only potential justification for continuing to detain Mr. Bowman was that the 
officers had found the baggie of methamphetamine in his pocket. The officers admitted 
that, prior to finding that baggie, they had no information suggesting potential drug 
activity. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.73, L. 20 - p. 74, L.1.) Therefore, without the baggie, 
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there was no justification for an expansion of the scope of the detention to investigate 
potential drug activity. 
However, as the district court correctly determined, the State had not proved that 
the consent exception, the stop-and-frisk exception, the exigent circumstances 
exception, or any other exception to the warrant requirement applied to Officer 
O'Gorman's warrantless search of Mr. Bowman's pocket. (R., pp.128-31.) As such, it 
properly found that the officers unlawfully searched Mr. Bowman's pocket when they 
found that baggie. (R., pp.128-31.) Therefore, the baggie was not legitimately 
discovered, and so, cannot serve as the basis to continue warrantlessly detaining 
Mr. Bowman. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 47·1, 487 (1963); State v. 
Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 6 (Ct. App. 2009). Holding otherwise would allow the officers to 
exploit the unlawful search and use the evidence found therein to the unlawfully-
searched person's disadvantage, and that would violate the unlawfully-searched 
person's constitutional rights a second time. Cf. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846-47 
(2004) ( explaining why officers had not exploited the unlawful search in that case, as 
well as explaining how they easily could have, in which case, the evidence found would 
have been inadmissible). 
Since the baggie unlawfully found in Mr. Bowman's pocket cannot be the basis 
for an expansion of the scope of the stop, the officers had no reasonable basis to 
continue detaining Mr. Bowman after they resolved their investigation into the report of 
domestic battery. Since Bullet was deployed after they had completed that 
investigation, the use of the drug dog in this case lengthened the duration of 
Mr. Bowman's detention. That constitutes a violation of Mr. Bowman's constitutional 
rights. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho at 6 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-1 O 
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(2005)); Aguirre, 141 Idaho at 563 (explaining that, in Caballes, the United States 
Supreme Court was careful to note that the drug dog sniff was permissible because the 
use of the dog in that case did not lengthen the duration of the stop). Therefore, the 
district court's order denying Mr. Bowman's motion to suppress the evidence found in 
the car should be reversed. 
D. The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Bowman's Motion To Suppress, Since 
The Evidence Found In Mr. Bowman's Car Was Fruit Of Officer O'Gorman's 
Unlawful Search Of Mr. Bowman's Pocket 
As previously noted, when the officers unlawfully search a person, the evidence 
seized as a result of that unlawful search must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous 
tree. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484. This includes both the direct and indirect products of 
that unlawful search. Id. "To determine whether to suppress evidence as 'fruit of the 
poisonous tree,' the court must inquire whether the evidence has been recovered as a 
result of the exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable 
to be purged of the taint." Page, 140 Idaho at 846. The defendant bears the burden of 
establishing the factual nexus between the unlawful search and the evidence in 
question.10 State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005). At that point, the 
State bears the burden of proving that the evidence in question has not been tainted by 
the unlawful search. State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 250 (1990). 
The district court applied a "but for" analysis to determine whether the evidence 
in the car should be suppressed as fruit of Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search. 
10 There is a factual nexus between the unlawful search and the evidence in question in 
this case. The officers asked Sergeant Walbey to have Bullet sniff Mr. Bowman's car 
because they found methamphetamine during the search of Mr. Bowman's pocket. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.81, Ls.19-23.) The officers searched Mr. Bowman's car based on the dog 
sniff. Therefore, the evidence in the car is factually tied to the unlawful search. 
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(R., p.132.) Specifically, it determined that the unlawful search was not the "but for" 
cause of the discovery of the evidence in the car; rather, it found the drug dog's alert 
superseded the unlawful search as the "but for" cause of the search of the car. 
(R., p.132.) This is not the correct analysis under the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine: "whether subsequent evidence constitutes 'fruit of the poisonous tree' is more 
than just a 'but for' test." See, e.g., State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187, 193 (2000). As 
the United States Supreme Court has explained: 
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply 
because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the 
police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is "whether, granting 
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant 
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or 
instead by some means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the 
primary taint." 
Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88. Thus, the appropriate question is not whether the 
officers would have obtained the evidence "but for" their knowledge of the baggie, but 
rather, whether the dog sniff, which led to the search of the car, was sufficiently 
separated from the taint of the unlawful search of Mr. Bowman's pocket. 
To properly determine whether the unlawful search is sufficiently separated from 
the evidence in question, the courts consider three factors: (1) the time elapsed 
between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) the occurrence of 
intervening circumstances; and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law 
enforcement action. Page, 140 Idaho at 846 (adopting this analysis from United 
Statesv. Green, 111 F.3d 515,521 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Brown v./1/inois, 422 U.S. 
590, 603-04 (1975))). Based on the facts of this case, all three of these factors 
demonstrate that the taint from Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search extends to the 
evidence found in Mr. Bowman's car. 
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1. The Minimal Temporal Separation Between The Unlawful Search And The 
Evidence Found In The Car Indicates That The Taint Affects The 
Evidence Found In The Car 
In this 
discovery of the 
almost no time elapsed between the unlawful and the 
in the car. (R., p.127 (district court finding that the total time 
from Bowman pulling over to Bullet sniffing the car was between five ten 
minutes).) Thus, this factor suggests that the taint from Officer O'Gorman's unlawful 
search projects onto the evidence found in the car. Green, 111 F.3d at 521. 
There Were No Intervening Circumstances Sufficient To Separate The 
Evidence Found In The Car From The Taint Of The Unlawful Search 
It is true that, between the two searches, Bullet sniffed and alerted on 
Mr. Bowman's car. However, simply because the drug dog sniff occurred between the 
unlawful search and the discovery of the evidence in question does not mean that the 
drug dog sniff is a sufficient intervening circumstance to attenuate the taint of the 
unlawful search from the evidence in question. See, e.g., Green, 111 F.3d at 521 
(explaining that a determination on one of the three factors is not dispositive). To 
determine whether an intervening circumstance shows sufficient attenuation between 
the unlawful search and the evidence in question, Idaho employs three related lines of 
analysis: the independent source doctrine, the inevitable discovery doctrine, and the 
attenuated basis exception. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495-99 (2001) (adopting 
and explaining these three exceptions to the exclusionary rule). However, none of 
those analyses are applicable in this case. 
a. The Independent Source Doctrine Is Inapplicable In This Case 
The independent source doctrine provides that, if the evidence is uncovered by a 
wholly separate line of investigation than the one tainted by the unlawful search, the 
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evidence is still admissible. Id. at 496-97. Here, Sergeant Walbey, Officer Domeny, 
and Officer O'Gorman were part of the same investigation, since they were working in 
concert to collect all the different accounts from witnesses and parties. Furthermore, 
Officers O'Gorman and Domeny asked Sergeant Walbey to have Bullet sniff 
Mr. Bowman's car because they had found methamphetamine during the course of that 
investigation. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.81, Ls.16-23.) Thus, Bullet's sniff is inexorably 
tied to the discovery of the baggie in Mr. Bowman's pocket; it definitely was not an 
independent investigation .11 
In fact, as Officer O'Gorman admitted, the officers possessed no information that 
would cause them to suspect drug activity absent the baggie they found in 
Mr. Bowman's pocket (Tr., Vol:1, p.73, L.20 - p.74, L.1.) Therefore, it cannot be said 
with any degree of certainty that, without finding that baggie during the illegal search, 
Bullet would have been deployed at all. Therefore, Bullet's sniff cannot be deemed an 
independent investigation. Because Sergeant Walbey and Bullet were not part of a 
wholly different line of investigation, the independent source doctrine does not apply in 
this case. 
b. The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Is Inapplicable In This Case 
The inevitable discovery doctrine is "in reality an extrapolation from the 
independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact 
11 Sergeant Walbey might have engaged in a fully independent investigation, had he 
immediately deployed Bullet upon arriving on the scene rather than assisting Officers 
Domeny and O'Gorman by interviewing Mr. Casey. Compare Page, 140 Idaho at 
846-47 (explaining that, in a similar set of circumstances, the order in which information 
is uncovered by officers is critical to the determination of whether or not the evidence 
has to be suppressed). However, as Sergeant Walbey did not pursue his own 
investigation, but rather, joined in the ongoing investigation, which was tainted by 
Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search, the independent source doctrine does not apply in 
this case. 
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discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would 
have been discovered." Stuart, 136 Idaho at 497-98 (quoting Murray v. United States, 
487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988)) (emphasis from original). Therefore, that analysis presumes 
that there was an independent source investigation that would have, through its own 
devices, ultimately uncovered the evidence, regardless of the violation of the 
defendant's rights. See id. However, as discussed, Officer Walbey and Bullet were not 
pursuing a separate line of investigation. Therefore, there was no independent 
investigation which could have inevitably discovered the evidence in the car. Thus, the 
inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply in this case either. 
C. The Attenuation Basis Exception Is Not Applicable In This Case 
The attenuation basis exception allows the State to present othervvise-tainted 
evidence if that evidence is accessed through independent, non-official sources that are 
in no way related to the unlawful search (such as through the testimony of wholly 
independent lay witnesses). 12 Stuart, 136 Idaho at 498 (discussing the opinion in 
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1978)). However, in Mr. Bowman's 
case, the tainted evidence found in the car was not accessed through some wholly 
unrelated non-government witness who was not located as part of the tainted 
investigation. It was being accessed through one of the officers who was actually 
involved in the investigation that was tainted by the unlawful search. Therefore, the 
attenuated basis exception is also not applicable in this case. 
Since none of the Stuart exceptions apply in this case, Bullet's sniff of the car 
was not a sufficient intervening circumstance to attenuate the evidence found in the car 
12 This is different than the independent source doctrine because the independent 
source doctrine focuses on other lines of official investigation. See id. 
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from the taint of Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search of Mr. Bowman. Therefore, the 
taint from Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search extends to the evidence found in the car. 
3. The Flagrancy Of The Officer's Misconduct And Lack Of Reasonable 
Purpose For The Unlawful Search Demonstrates That The Taint From The 
Unlawful Search Extends To The Evidence Found In The Car 
Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search contained several flagrant violations and 
served no reasonable purpose. He warrantlessly searched Mr. Bowman's person 
without asking for Mr. Bowman's consent when he purportedly saw Mr. Bowman trying 
to reach into his pocket. (Tr., Vol.1, p.76, Ls.9-11.) When Officer O'Gorman asked 
Mr. Bowman what he was purportedly trying to get from his pocket, Mr. Bowman told 
him he was trying to get a cigarette. (Tr., Vol.1, p.69, Ls.5-7.) Officer O'Gorman 
testified that he was concerned Mr. Bowman was trying to get a weapon. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.69, Ls.11-15.) 
However, that is not a reasonable purpose, given the facts of this case. The 
most important fact in that regard is that Officer Domeny had already performed a pat 
down search for weapons and found none. (Tr., Vol.1, p.49, L.22 - p.50, L.5.) 
Furthermore, Mr. Bowman had been cooperative throughout the investigation, and there 
was no evidence that he was intoxicated or otherwise threatening; in fact, he was still 
handcuffed. (Tr., Vol.1, p.43, Ls.22-24; Tr., Vol.1, p.49, L.16 - p.50, L.25.) Therefore, 
Officer O'Gorman performed a second pat down search (focused on Mr. Bowman's 
pocket) without reasonable suspicion that Mr. Bowman was either armed or presently 
dangerous. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804 (2009) (discussing what facts 
need to be present for an officer to have a reasonable fear for his safety); 
State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655 (2006) (same); State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728 (Ct. App. 
2005) (same). 
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Furthermore, when Officer O'Gorman performed his pat down search of 
Mr. Bowman's pocket, he felt an object consistent with a pack of cigarettes, and he did 
not feel anything he thought might be a weapon. (Tr., Vol.1, p.76, Ls.3-5.) And yet, 
despite having confirmed that there was nothing in the pocket giving him a reasonable 
basis to fear for his safety, particularly since Mr. Bowman remained handcuffed 
throughout this encounter, 13 Officer O'Gorman still decided to warrantlessly invade 
Mr. Bowman's privacy by reaching into the pocket. (Tr., Vol.1, p.69, L.20.) 
The flagrancy of this violation is also enhanced by the fact that this occurred 
during the one portion of the stop that Officer Domeny had turned off his dashboard 
camera. ( See Tr., Vol.1, p.24, L.23 - p.25, L:13.) This is the device that is designed to 
help prevent violations of a person's rights during a traffic stop, and yet, the officers 
decided to turn it off. As Ms. Phillips' attorney pointed out below, there was no reason 
for that camera to be turned off unless the officers wanted to prevent the courts from 
seeing what they were about to do, which in this case, was violate Mr. Bowman's 
constitutional rights. (Tr., Vol.1, p.107, Ls.15-21.) Thus, the flagrant nature of the 
unlawful search coupled with the lack of a reasonable purpose means the taint is more 
likely to extend to indirect fruits of that search. 
The conclusion that the flagrancy of the officers' conduct indicates that the taint 
extends to the evidence in the car is reinforced by the fact that the district court made a 
13 The fact that Mr. Bowman remained handcuffed also demonstrates that it was unlikely 
that he would be able to destroy any then-unidentified evidence that might have been in 
his pocket. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.75, Ls.23-25 (Officer O'Gorman expressing his 
disbelief that Mr. Bowman would be able to perform tasks effectively (such as 
extracting, lighting, and smoking a cigarette) with his hands restrained as they were).) 
Hence, the district court's determination that the State failed to prove the exigency 
exception. (R., p.131.) Therefore, exigency is not a proper justification for Officer 
O'Gorman's search either. 
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clearly erroneous factual finding that Mr. Bowman consented to Officer Domeny's initial 
pat down search of his person. (R., p.126.) The video of that portion of the stop 
demonstrates that, after Mr. Bowman was placed in handcuffs and he told Officer 
Domeny that he did not have any weapons on him, Officer Domeny asked, "Mind if I 
check?" (Exhibit 1, Video 1, approximately 2:29.) The only audible response 
Mr. Bowman gave was, "Yeah." (Exhibit 1, Video 1, approximately 2:29.) Mr. Bowman 
submitted an affidavit averring that he did not consent to Officer Domeny's pat down 
search (i.e., "yeah, I do mind if you check"). (R., p.106.) Officer Domeny' testimony, 
that Mr. Bowman told him "[G]o ahead," was not consistent with the video. (Tr., Vol. ·1, 
p.48, L.8.) Therefore, there is not substantial and competent evidence that Mr. Bowman 
consented to that search (much less that he voluntarily did so (a point on which there 
was no discussion by the district court (see generally R., pp.124-35))). As the State 
bears the burden of proof when it comes to exceptions to the warrant requirement, the 
fact that there is not substantial evidence should weigh against finding that the 
exception exists in this case. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390-91; Holton, 132 Idaho at 
503-04. Therefore, the district court's conclusion that Mr. Bowman gave his consent for 
that search was also clearly erroneous and should be set aside. 
Officer Domeny's pat down search of Mr. Bowman was conducted without the 
requisite reasonable suspicion that Mr. Bowman was armed and presently dangerous. 
See, e.g., Bishop, 146 Idaho at 818; Henage, 143 Idaho at 660. As such, Officer 
Domeny's pat down search was also unlawful, meaning Mr. Bowman was subjected to 
two unlawful searches before the evidence in his car was discovered, and that only 
reinforces the conclusion that the taint of the unlawful searches extends to the evidence 
found in the car. 
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Therefore, considering all three of the Page/Green factors, the taint from Officer 
O'Gorman's unlawful search extends to the evidence found in the car, despite Bullet's 
alert on the car. This is consistent with the purposes of the exclusionary rule, as one of 
its many purposes is to protect against police misconduct. State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 
511, 519 (2012) (recognizing and reaffirming the multiple justifications for the 
exclusionary rule). And yet, the district court's decision to not suppress the evidence 
found in the car as fruit of Officer O'Gorman's unlawful search actually rewards the 
officers for their unlawful conduct. They had no other reason to suspect drug activity, 
except the direct fruit of their unlawful search. Thus, in this case, the exclusionary rule 
should have been extended to the evidence found in the car. Therefore, this Court 
should reverse the district court's decision denying Mr. Bowman's motion to suppress 
the evidence found in the car. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bowman respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order denying his 
motion to suppress the evidence found in the car and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this y!h day of November, 2014. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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